Changeset - ef392737c203
[Not reviewed]
stable
0 1 0
Mads Kiilerich - 10 years ago 2015-09-26 02:34:37
madski@unity3d.com
auth: validate that the token protecting from CSRF attacks never is leaked

This will partly give some protection if it should happen, partly make sure the
leak doesn't go unnoticed but is found so it can be fixed.
1 file changed with 10 insertions and 1 deletions:
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kallithea/lib/auth.py
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@@ -13,49 +13,49 @@
 
# along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 
"""
 
kallithea.lib.auth
 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 

	
 
authentication and permission libraries
 

	
 
This file was forked by the Kallithea project in July 2014.
 
Original author and date, and relevant copyright and licensing information is below:
 
:created_on: Apr 4, 2010
 
:author: marcink
 
:copyright: (c) 2013 RhodeCode GmbH, and others.
 
:license: GPLv3, see LICENSE.md for more details.
 
"""
 
import time
 
import os
 
import logging
 
import traceback
 
import hashlib
 
import itertools
 
import collections
 

	
 
from decorator import decorator
 

	
 
from pylons import url, request
 
from pylons import url, request, session
 
from pylons.controllers.util import abort, redirect
 
from pylons.i18n.translation import _
 
from webhelpers.pylonslib import secure_form
 
from sqlalchemy import or_
 
from sqlalchemy.orm.exc import ObjectDeletedError
 
from sqlalchemy.orm import joinedload
 

	
 
from kallithea import __platform__, is_windows, is_unix
 
from kallithea.lib.vcs.utils.lazy import LazyProperty
 
from kallithea.model import meta
 
from kallithea.model.meta import Session
 
from kallithea.model.user import UserModel
 
from kallithea.model.db import User, Repository, Permission, \
 
    UserToPerm, UserGroupRepoToPerm, UserGroupToPerm, UserGroupMember, \
 
    RepoGroup, UserGroupRepoGroupToPerm, UserIpMap, UserGroupUserGroupToPerm, \
 
    UserGroup, UserApiKeys
 

	
 
from kallithea.lib.utils2 import safe_unicode, aslist
 
from kallithea.lib.utils import get_repo_slug, get_repo_group_slug, \
 
    get_user_group_slug, conditional_cache
 
from kallithea.lib.caching_query import FromCache
 

	
 

	
 
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -745,48 +745,57 @@ class LoginRequired(object):
 

	
 
        # check if we used an API key and it's a valid one
 
        api_key = request.GET.get('api_key')
 
        if api_key is not None:
 
            # explicit controller is enabled or API is in our whitelist
 
            if self.api_access or allowed_api_access(loc, api_key=api_key):
 
                if api_key in user.api_keys:
 
                    log.info('user %s authenticated with API key ****%s @ %s',
 
                             user, api_key[-4:], loc)
 
                    return func(*fargs, **fkwargs)
 
                else:
 
                    log.warning('API key ****%s is NOT valid', api_key[-4:])
 
                    return redirect_to_login(_('Invalid API key'))
 
            else:
 
                # controller does not allow API access
 
                log.warning('API access to %s is not allowed', loc)
 
                return abort(403)
 

	
 
        # Only allow the following HTTP request methods. (We sometimes use POST
 
        # requests with a '_method' set to 'PUT' or 'DELETE'; but that is only
 
        # used for the route lookup, and does not affect request.method.)
 
        if request.method not in ['GET', 'HEAD', 'POST', 'PUT']:
 
            return abort(405)
 

	
 
        # Make sure CSRF token never appears in the URL. If so, invalidate it.
 
        if secure_form.token_key in request.GET:
 
            log.error('CSRF key leak detected')
 
            session.pop(secure_form.token_key, None)
 
            session.save()
 
            from kallithea.lib import helpers as h
 
            h.flash(_("CSRF token leak has been detected - all form tokens have been expired"),
 
                    category='error')
 

	
 
        # CSRF protection: Whenever a request has ambient authority (whether
 
        # through a session cookie or its origin IP address), it must include
 
        # the correct token, unless the HTTP method is GET or HEAD (and thus
 
        # guaranteed to be side effect free. In practice, the only situation
 
        # where we allow side effects without ambient authority is when the
 
        # authority comes from an API key; and that is handled above.
 
        if request.method not in ['GET', 'HEAD']:
 
            token = request.POST.get(secure_form.token_key)
 
            if not token or token != secure_form.authentication_token():
 
                log.error('CSRF check failed')
 
                return abort(403)
 

	
 
        # WebOb already ignores request payload parameters for anything other
 
        # than POST/PUT, but double-check since other Kallithea code relies on
 
        # this assumption.
 
        if request.method not in ['POST', 'PUT'] and request.POST:
 
            log.error('%r request with payload parameters; WebOb should have stopped this', request.method)
 
            return abort(400)
 

	
 
        # regular user authentication
 
        if user.is_authenticated:
 
            log.info('user %s authenticated with regular auth @ %s', user, loc)
 
            return func(*fargs, **fkwargs)
 
        else:
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