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auth: secure password reset implementation
This is a better implementation of password reset function, which
doesn't involve sending a new password to the user's email address
in clear text, and at the same time is stateless.
The old implementation generated a new password and sent it
in clear text to whatever email assigned to the user currently,
so that any user, possibly unauthenticated, could request a reset
for any username or email. Apart from potential insecurity, this
made it possible for anyone to disrupt users' workflow by repeatedly
resetting their passwords.
The idea behind this implementation is to generate
an authentication token which is dependent on the user state
at the time before the password change takes place, so the token
is one-time and can't be reused, and also to bind the token to
the browser session.
The token is calculated as SHA1 hash of the following:
* user's identifier (number, not a name)
* timestamp
* hashed user's password
* session identifier
* per-application secret
We use numeric user's identifier, as it's fixed and doesn't change,
so renaming users doesn't affect the mechanism. Timestamp is added
to make it possible to limit the token's validness (currently hard
coded to 24h), and we don't want users to be able to fake that field
easily. Hashed user's password is needed to prevent using the token
again once the password has been changed. Session identifier is
an additional security measure to ensure someone else stealing the
token can't use it. Finally, per-application secret is just another
way to make it harder for an attacker to guess all values in an
attempt to generate a valid token.
When the token is generated, an anonymous user is directed to a
confirmation page where the timestamp and the usernames are already
preloaded, so the user needs to specify the token. User can either
click the link in the email if it's really them reading it, or to type
the token manually.
Using the right token in the same session as it was requested directs
the user to a password change form, where the user is supposed to
specify a new password (twice, of course). Upon completing the form
(which is POSTed) the password change happens and a notification
mail is sent.
The test is updated to test the basic functionality with a bad and
a good token, but it doesn't (yet) cover all code paths.
The original work from Andrew has been thorougly reviewed and heavily
modified by Søren Løvborg.
This is a better implementation of password reset function, which
doesn't involve sending a new password to the user's email address
in clear text, and at the same time is stateless.
The old implementation generated a new password and sent it
in clear text to whatever email assigned to the user currently,
so that any user, possibly unauthenticated, could request a reset
for any username or email. Apart from potential insecurity, this
made it possible for anyone to disrupt users' workflow by repeatedly
resetting their passwords.
The idea behind this implementation is to generate
an authentication token which is dependent on the user state
at the time before the password change takes place, so the token
is one-time and can't be reused, and also to bind the token to
the browser session.
The token is calculated as SHA1 hash of the following:
* user's identifier (number, not a name)
* timestamp
* hashed user's password
* session identifier
* per-application secret
We use numeric user's identifier, as it's fixed and doesn't change,
so renaming users doesn't affect the mechanism. Timestamp is added
to make it possible to limit the token's validness (currently hard
coded to 24h), and we don't want users to be able to fake that field
easily. Hashed user's password is needed to prevent using the token
again once the password has been changed. Session identifier is
an additional security measure to ensure someone else stealing the
token can't use it. Finally, per-application secret is just another
way to make it harder for an attacker to guess all values in an
attempt to generate a valid token.
When the token is generated, an anonymous user is directed to a
confirmation page where the timestamp and the usernames are already
preloaded, so the user needs to specify the token. User can either
click the link in the email if it's really them reading it, or to type
the token manually.
Using the right token in the same session as it was requested directs
the user to a password change form, where the user is supposed to
specify a new password (twice, of course). Upon completing the form
(which is POSTed) the password change happens and a notification
mail is sent.
The test is updated to test the basic functionality with a bad and
a good token, but it doesn't (yet) cover all code paths.
The original work from Andrew has been thorougly reviewed and heavily
modified by Søren Løvborg.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 | /**
* Sphinx stylesheet -- default theme
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*/
@import url("basic.css");
/* -- page layout ----------------------------------------------------------- */
body {
font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
font-size: 100%;
background-color: #111;
color: #555;
margin: 0;
padding: 0;
}
div.documentwrapper {
float: left;
width: 100%;
}
div.bodywrapper {
margin: 0 0 0 230px;
}
hr{
border: 1px solid #B1B4B6;
}
div.document {
background-color: #eee;
}
div.body {
background-color: #ffffff;
color: #3E4349;
padding: 0 30px 30px 30px;
font-size: 0.8em;
}
div.footer {
color: #555;
width: 100%;
padding: 13px 0;
text-align: center;
font-size: 75%;
}
div.footer a {
color: #444;
text-decoration: underline;
}
div.related {
background-color: #577632;
line-height: 32px;
color: #fff;
text-shadow: 0px 1px 0 #444;
font-size: 0.80em;
}
div.related a {
color: #E2F3CC;
}
div.sphinxsidebar {
font-size: 0.75em;
line-height: 1.5em;
}
div.sphinxsidebarwrapper{
padding: 20px 0;
}
div.sphinxsidebar h3,
div.sphinxsidebar h4 {
font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
color: #222;
font-size: 1.2em;
font-weight: normal;
margin: 0;
padding: 5px 10px;
background-color: #ddd;
text-shadow: 1px 1px 0 white
}
div.sphinxsidebar h4{
font-size: 1.1em;
}
div.sphinxsidebar h3 a {
color: #444;
}
div.sphinxsidebar p {
color: #888;
padding: 5px 20px;
}
div.sphinxsidebar p.topless {
}
div.sphinxsidebar ul {
margin: 10px 20px;
padding: 0;
color: #000;
}
div.sphinxsidebar a {
color: #444;
}
div.sphinxsidebar input {
border: 1px solid #ccc;
font-family: sans-serif;
font-size: 1em;
}
div.sphinxsidebar input[type=text]{
margin-left: 20px;
}
div.sphinxsidebar input[type=image] {
border: 0;
}
/* -- body styles ----------------------------------------------------------- */
a {
color: #005B81;
text-decoration: none;
}
a:hover {
color: #E32E00;
text-decoration: underline;
}
div.body h1,
div.body h2,
div.body h3,
div.body h4,
div.body h5,
div.body h6 {
font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
background-color: #BED4EB;
font-weight: normal;
color: #212224;
margin: 30px 0px 10px 0px;
padding: 5px 0 5px 10px;
text-shadow: 0px 1px 0 white
}
div.body h1 { border-top: 20px solid white; margin-top: 0; font-size: 200%; }
div.body h2 { font-size: 150%; background-color: #C8D5E3; }
div.body h3 { font-size: 120%; background-color: #D8DEE3; }
div.body h4 { font-size: 110%; background-color: #D8DEE3; }
div.body h5 { font-size: 100%; background-color: #D8DEE3; }
div.body h6 { font-size: 100%; background-color: #D8DEE3; }
a.headerlink {
color: #c60f0f;
font-size: 0.8em;
padding: 0 4px 0 4px;
text-decoration: none;
}
a.headerlink:hover {
background-color: #c60f0f;
color: white;
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div.body p, div.body dd, div.body li {
line-height: 1.5em;
}
div.admonition p.admonition-title + p {
display: inline;
}
div.highlight{
background-color: white;
}
div.note {
background-color: #eee;
border: 1px solid #ccc;
}
div.seealso {
background-color: #ffc;
border: 1px solid #ff6;
}
div.topic {
background-color: #eee;
}
div.warning {
background-color: #ffe4e4;
border: 1px solid #f66;
}
p.admonition-title {
display: inline;
}
p.admonition-title:after {
content: ":";
}
pre {
padding: 10px;
background-color: White;
color: #222;
line-height: 1.2em;
border: 1px solid #C6C9CB;
font-size: 1.2em;
margin: 1.5em 0 1.5em 0;
box-shadow: 1px 1px 1px #d8d8d8;
}
tt {
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color: #222;
padding: 1px 2px;
font-size: 1.2em;
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}
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